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No. 2

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES IN KENTUCKY.
1.

The Problem Stated.

The common law rule against perpetuities may be stated
thus: any attempt to create an executory or contingent interest
in propertyis void, if, according to the terms of the limitation, that
interest might by any possibility vest at a date more remote than
twenty one years after the end of some life or lives in being at
the time of the attempt, periods of actual gestation not counted.
The possibility of such remoteness is to be viewed from the time
of the attempt to create the interest, i. e. the date of the deed or
the death of the testator when the limitation is contained in a will.
This common law rule originated in what may be called judicial legislation by the English courts, and it was recognized and
applied in a considerable number of Kentucky cases before the
the passage of any statute, for example: Moore v. Howe, 4 T. B:
Mon. 199; Brashear v. Macey, 3 J. J. Marsh. 89; Luke v. Marshall, 5 J. J. Marsh, 353; Brown's Heirs v. Brown's Devisees,
1 Dana 39; Attorney General v. Wallace, 7 B. Mon. 611. The
Legislature passed in 1852 and there has ever since existed as a
part of our statute law the following provision, now section 2360
of Judge Carroll's edition of the statutes:
"The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period than during the continuance of a life or lives in being
at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years and ten
months thereafter."
Probably this provision was intended to be declaratory of the
common law. The courts have frequently assumed that the
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statute merely declared the common law rule, and have sometimes
expressly so stated. For example, in Kasey v Fidelity Trust
Company, 131 Ky. 609, 115 S. W. 739, the Court says: Section
2360, Ky. St., which is declaratory of the common law rule on the
subject, is as follows:" and then quotes that section. The purpose of this essay is to enquire whether the statute of 1852 has
changed the common law rule and if so, to what extent.
2. A Rule Against Remoteness or a Rule Against Restraints
on Alienation.
It will be observed the common law rule against perpetuities
is a rule against remoteness in the vesting of interests or estates
whereas the statute forbids, in terms, suspension of the power of
alienation.
Frequently an interest which is not vested can not be allened
because none or not all of the persons in whom it may vest. are
yet in being. To illustrate, the testator devises land to his son A
for life, remainder to A's youngest son for life, and remainder in
fee to that grandson's youngest son. A survives the testator.
Here it is perfectly obvious that the gift to the gift, to the great
grandchild may not vest until more than twenty one years after
A's death. Hence the gift to him would be void under the common
law rule because too remote. It is equally obvious that this last
mentioned remainder in fee would be inalienable so long'as there
is a possibility of a younger son being born. If that limitation
were valid, the power of alienation might be suspended for more
than twenty one years and ten months after A's death. A number of the limitations which have been held bad under the Kentucky statute are both too remote as to vesting and also susdend
the power of alienation for more than the statutory period. Limitations of that sort are held invalid in the following cases:
Stevens v. Stevens, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1315, 54 S.W. 835; Coleman
v. Coleman, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1476, 65 S.W. 832; Fidelity Trust
Company v. Lloyd, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1827, 78 S. W. 896; U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Douglas, 134 Ky. 378, 120 S. W.
328; Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Company, 158 Ky. 280,
164 S.W. 939.
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On the other hand, a future interest may be executory or
contingent and yet alienable. Suppose a devise to A for life,
with remainder to A's youngest son for life, and remainder in fee
to B if A's youngest son dies childless, but remainder in fee to C
if A's youngest son does not die childless. The contingent
remainaIers to B. and C. are too remote under the common law
rule against perpetuities, because neither of them can vest until
the death of A's youngest son. Yet as soon as A dies and his
youngest son is determined, that life tenant together with B and
C could join in conveying a perfect title if the two contingent
remainders were valid. Though contingent, one or the other of
them would be certain to vest.
We can suppose a simpler case which violates the common
law rule against perpetuities without making alienation impossible. Testator devises land to A and his*heirs, with an executory
devise over to B and his heirs in the event that A's direct
descendants shall become extinct within four generations. Here
A and B could immediately join in conveying a perfect title, yet
the executory devise to A is void for remoteness under the common law rule.
Are such limitations bad in Kentucky? If so, is it because
the statute is construed as forbidding them, or is it becaue there
is in Kentucky a common law rule against remoteness in vesting
in addition to the statutory rule against suspending the power of
alienation?
In Patterson v. Patterson, 135 Ky. 339, 122 S. W. 169, the
Court, in discussing section 2360, said:
"Without enterting upon a dissertation as to the meaning of the legal term, 'perpetuity', it is sufficient to say
that the purpose of the statute is not to compel the vesting
of estates, but to prohibit unreasonable restraints upon
alienation. "
In that case, A had conveyed land to a turnpike company for a
toll-gate house with a provision in the deed that when it ceased
to be used for that purpose the lot should "revert" to B, C, and
D, or their heirs. The hse for that purpose having ceased, B. C.
and D took possession and, after many years, brought a suit to
quiet title against claims by the heirs and devises of A. It was
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held that the lower court should have overruled a demurrer to the
petition. The court based its decision in part upon the ground
that
"The deed did not render the property inalienable, for
the turnpike company, after receiving it, had at any time
the right to sell its turnpike to an individual, company, or
the fiscal court, and with such sale convey the use of the
ground and toll-house to its vendee and its vendee to
another, ad libitum, so long as the property was used for
the single purpose to which it was devoted by the Smedley
deed. On the other hand, appellants had like power to sell
and convey at any time the reversionary interest in the toll
house and ground conveyed them by the deed."
But the court also placed its decision upon three other grounds.
It thought that A's heirs were barred by long acquiescence on her
part and theirs in the possession of B, C, and D. It had the idea
that even though an interest might possibly vest at too remote a
time viewed from the date of the deed creating it, there would
be no objection under the rule against perpetuities if there were
no such possibility of remoteness at the death of the grantor.
We should note in passing that this idea is at variance with the
true rule of common law in the case of a deed although it it perfectly sound as to a will, which does not become effective when it
is executed but when the testator dies. The court also based its
decision in this case upon the ground that the interest here was a
possibility of reverter analogous to the resulting trust to the donor
after a 'charitable trust has come to an end. As the court
expressed it, the rule against perpetuities "does not apply to a
conveyance of land for a public highway, or for use in connection
with the operation of a, turnpike (citing a case on charitable
trusts). If the deed * * * had not provided for the reversion of the title upon the abandonment of the use of the land for
tollhouse purposes, nevertheless, under the law of this state, it
would in consequence of such abandonment have reverted- to the
grantor, and, this being true, neither the statute against perpetuities nor other obstable stood in the way of her providing in the
deed for its reversion to another or others instead of herself."
The decision might also be supported on the theory that if the
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interest of B, C, and D was too remote, the claim of A's heirs
would likewise be too remote, and therefore B, C, and D being in
possession would have a better claim than the defendants who
had never been in possession.
Summing up the discussion of this case, Patterson v. Patterson may be cited to support the proposition that an interest too
remote under the common law rule against perpetuities is valid
in Kentucky if it can be aliened, but the weight of the case as
an authority for that proposition is weakened by the fact that the
decision would be the same even if the rule as to remote alienable interests is otherwise.
On the other hand, there are at least four Kentucky cases
in which the court says that a certain limitation is invalid, when
an examination of the facts discloses that the interest created is
too remote as to vesting- but would be alienable forthwith if it
were valid.
In Morgan v. Denny, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 346, 10 Ky. Op. 796,
there was a gift over to "my son James and his heirs" upon an
indefinite failure of the issue of the first taker. The case is only
abstracted in the Kentucky Law Reporter, but the opinion is
given in full in Kentucky Opinions, and one can observe there
that the opinion makes no mention of the statute but says the
gift over violates "the rule of law against perpetuities" and cites
only cases antedating the passage of the statute. The failure of
the Court to notice this decision in its opinion in the Patterson
case should be considered in weighing that case as an authority.
The other three cases referred to have been decided since
Patterson v. Patterson. In Linder v. Ehrich, 147 Ky. 85,143 S. W.,
778, a gift over to certain collateral kindred in case none of the
testator's grandchildren left surviving issue, was considered bad.
This gift over was clearly too remote as to its vesting under the
common law rule against perpetuities, but the persons to whom it
was given might have aliened forthwith. It should be noticed,
however, that the collateral kindred had not appealed.
In Beall v. Wilson, 146 Ky. 646, 143 S. W. 55, a gift over to
collateral kindred if all of the children of the first taker should
die without issue, was held bad. In this case the appeal was
taken by the collateral kindred and the validity of that gift was
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the sole question before the court. This is a decision squarely
contra to the language in the Patterson case, The Court cites
the Kentucky statute and talks about the period allowed by the
statute, but relies largely upon general text-books on real property. The Patterson case is not referred to in the opinion.
In Miller v. Miller, 151 Ky. 563, 152 S. W. 542, the portion
given to one of the testator's children as first taker was devised
over to his other children in the event of a failure of that
daughter's issue either before or after her death. The Court
cites the provision of the Kentucky Statutes, sec. 2343, that a
limitation upon an attempted fee-tail shall be held valid, when
the limitation would be valid upon a fee-simple, and then goes on
to say that the gift over is bad because it provides for the "vesting" of an estate at a period beyond the life or lives in being and
twenty-one years and ten months thereafter. It should be observed, however, that here as in Linder v. Ehrich the persons to
whom was given the remote but alienable interest, had not
appealed.
We have, then, on the one hand, to support the view that the
Kentucky law permits an interest remote as to vesting provided
it is alienable, the language and one of the r'ationes decidendi of
the Patterson case and the argument that such is the most natural
interpretation of the statute. On the other hand, we have the
earlier case of Morgan v. Denny, the later square decision in
Beall v. Wilson, and the view expressed by the Court as to the
invalidity of the limitations in Linder v. Ehrich and Miller v.
Miller. No one can say with assurance that the law is either one
way or the other.
If the Kentucky law does forbid an interest too remote as to
its vesting but which would be alienable if valid, is the law so
because the statute is to be construed as forbidding such interests or because the common law rule against remoteness is not
supplanted by the statute against suspension of the power to
alien? One could hardly do more than guess at the answer to
that inquiry, but it would become important if the statutory
period of a life or lives in being and 21 years and 10 months
thereafter is found to be different from the period prescribed by
the common law rule against remoteness.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
3.

ForbiddingAlienation of Vested Estates.

The common law rule against perpetuities, as has been
repeatedly pointed out, has to do with the vesting of estates.
If the instrument creating a vested estate forbids its alienation
for a period exceeding that prescribed by the statutes, the
attempted restraint on alienation is invalid in Kentucky. Sometimes the reason given is that it violates the statute. An example
of this is Ernst v. Shinkle, 95 Ky., 608, 16 Ky. L. Rep., 179, 26
S. W., 813.
There are a number of Kentucky cases upholding a clause
forbidding the alienation of a vested interest for some period less
than that prescribed by the statute against perpetuities. Where
the court simply refuses to order a sale for reinvestment because
of a clause forbidding a sale, the result is to be supported on the
ground given in Chenault v. Burgess, 29 Ky. L. Rep., 569, 93 S.
W., 664, where the court said:
"It may be unfortunate that the grantor tied up the
title to the land as he did, forbidding the sale of it by
judicial proceedings for reinvestment under section 491 of
the Code. But the court has no inherent power to sell such
a title for reinvestment of the proceeds in other property,
and the statute which confers the power expressly excepts
out of its operation cases of this sort."
Other cases where the court refused to order a sale because
of a clause forbidding alienation in the instrument creating the
interest are Ennen v. Air,, 31 Ky. L. Rep., 1184, 104 S. W., 960,
and Morton v. Morton, 120 Ky., 251, 27 Ky. L. Rep., 661, 85 S.
W., 1188.
The court has repeatedly upheld clauses forbidding alienation for what it considered a reasonable period, in each instance
a period less than that laid down in the statute against perpetuities. Thus a clause forbidding alienation by a devisee in fee
for a specified time has been enforced, Stewart v. Brady. 3 Bush
623 (until devisee in fee reaches age of 35), Stewart v. Barrow,
7 Bush 368 (exact time not stated in opinion), Wallace v. Smith,
113 Ky. 263, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 139, 68 S. W. 1028, (until devisee in
fee reaches 35); Smith v. Isaacs, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1727, 78 S. W.
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434 (same period). Likewise a clause forbidding alienation by a
remainder-man in fee during the life of the life tenant has been
held reasonable, Lawson v. Lightfoot, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 84
S. W. 7391 Frazier v. Combs, 140 Ky. 77, 130 S. W. 812. The
same thing is true of a clause forbidding alienation by life tenants
during their own lives, Holt's Executor v. Deshon, 126 Ky. 310,
31 Ky. L. Rep. 744, 103 S. W. 281. This rule that the restraint of
alienation for a reasonable period is permitted, although well
established in Kentucky, is contrary to the overwhelming weight
of authority in other jurisdictions, as is recognized by the later
Kentucky cases. Even in Kentucky. it cannot prevent the property from being subjected to the claims of creditors, Smith v.
Smith, 115 Ky. 329, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2261, 73 S. W. 1028, and an
ingenious lawyer ought to find little difficulty in avoiding the
restrictions of such a clause by having an accomodating creditor
to force a sale.
We have the rule that a clause forbidding a sale for a
reasonable period effectively prevents a voluntary sale. What is
a reasonable time? In Robsion v. Gray, 29 Ky. L. Rep., 1296,
97 S. W., 347, the court says:
"The provision that the land is never to be sold in the
clause giving it to the heirs of John G. Gray, is void, as
creating a perpetuity in violation of section 2360 of the
Kentucky Statutes, although the restriction on the power
of alienation by John G. Gray was valid, as under the statutes the power of alienation may be suspended during the
life in being at the creation of the estate."
The intimation in this dictum that the test is the period in
section 2360, is certainly not the law in view of later decisions.
In Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky., 767, 117 S. W., 264, the court held
invalid a clause prohibiting a devisee in fee from conveying or
encumbering the land during his entire lifetime. In Cropper v.
Bowles, 150 Ky., 393, 150 S. W., 380, the court held invalid a
similar provision in a deed which however did not forbid a devise
by the first taker nor a sale for reinvestment under orders of
court.

To sum up the law under this heading, we may say: A clause
forbidding voluntary alienation for a reasonable period is effec-
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tive. A period exceeding that stated in the statute on perpetuities is unreasonable, but a period less than that stated in the
statute is not necessarily reasonable, its reasonableness must be
determined by some other test.
4. Periods of Gestation.
Is the period allowed under the Kentucky statute the same
as that allowed by the common law rule against perpetuities?
Suppose a devise to A and his heirs subject to a gift over in case
A's descendants should become extinct within 21 years and 10
months after A's death. The gift over would be too remote
according to the common law rule. Although periods of actual
gestation are permitted in addition to the period of lives in being
and 21 years, the period cannot be "in gross." Does the Kentucky
statute permit the ten months to be "in gross?"
If so, may a period of actual gestation be allowed in addition
to the 21 years and 10 months? Suppose a devise to those grandchilden of the testator who are alive when his youngest grandchild shall reach the age of 21 years and 10 months. Here, if the
testator's last surviving child should die, and have a posthumous
child, that child would not reach the age of 21 years and 10
months until 21 years and 10 months plus the period of gestation
after the end of the lives in being at the testator's death.
Upon these two problems, we can do no more than guess what
construction the court would put upon the statute.
May more than one period of actual gestation be allowed?
Suppose a gift to those grandchildren of the testator who reach
their majority. If the testator has a posthumous child, and that
child has a posthumous child, what them? The answer must be
that the testator's unborn child is nevertheless a life in being
within the meaning of the statute, and that the result here is the
same under the statute as under the common law rule.
5. Conclusion.
A correct solution of the problems which have been discussed
here is perhaps not very important. The careful practitioner will
in any case of doubt follow the maxim, "Safety first," and advise
against relying upon a title which depends upon either view as to
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these questions, until an adjudication can be had on that very
case. That such questions can still be considered open when
more than half a century has passed since the adoption of the
statute, illustrates the folly of hoping to clarify the law by passing statutes thought to be declaratory of common law rules.
REUBEN

B. HUTCHCRAFT, JR.

REVIEWS.
A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: by Frederick W. Maitland, L.L. D.,

Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of
Cambridge, and Francis C. Montague M. A., Professor of History,
University College, London, Late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford;
Edited with Notes and Appendices by James F. Colby, Parker Professor of Law in Dartmouth College; G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

The names of the authors and contributors to this volume are
too well known as those of authorities to need any comment.
Following the very able and instructive article of Dr. Joseph
Redlich, of the University of Vienna, treating of the weaknesses
of the "case method" in American law schools, the appearance
of this collection is very opportune. The book contains a reprint
of a series of articles upon the chief epochs in the history of our
law, constituting a "brief but comprehensive, accurate but untechnical" account of the origin and growth of the English law.
For the ordinary reader and for the student the volume is an
admirable introduction and guide to English legal history.
As an appendix to each chapter, a list of recommended readings upon the different topics treated adds greatly to the usefulness of the book.
by Edward
H. Warren, Story Professor of Law in Harvard University; published
by the Editor, Cambridge, 1915.

SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY:

This is one of the new case books prepared in accordance with
the decision of the professors of the Harvard Law School who
conduct the courses given to first year students. They acted in
furtherance of a decision to make a general change in the courses
offered to those first entering on the study of the law. The expe-

